This note considers a standard multinomial choice model. It is shown that if the distribution of additive utility shocks has a density then the mapping from deterministic components of utilities to choice probabilities is surjective. In other words, any vector of choice probabilities can be obtained by selecting suitable utilities for alternatives. This result has implications for at least three areas of interest to econometricians: Hotz and Miller (1993) estimator for structural dynamic discrete choice models, nonparametric identification of multinomial choice models, and consistency of conditional density estimators based on covariate dependent mixtures.
MAIN RESULT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Multinomial choice models were introduced in economics by McFadden (1974) and since then have been extensively used in applications. In the model, the agent chooses between J + 1 possible alternatives denoted by {0, 1, . . . , J}. The utility from choosing alternative j is given by u j + j , where u j is a deterministic component of the utility, which might depend on agent's and alternative's characteristics and j is a random shock. Let us denote the distribution of = ( 0 , . . . , J ) by G and assume that it satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1 G is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, i.e., G has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Multinomial logit and probit models are most commonly used in applications. The former is 1 Current version: October 8, 2012. 2 We are grateful to Bo Honore for helpful discussions. We thank anonymous referees for comments that helped to improve the manuscript.
A structural dynamic discrete choice model is a dynamic optimization model with discrete controls. Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) , Rust (1994 ), Miller (1997 , Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007a) , and Keane et al. (2010) survey the literature on applications of these models in empirical work. Rust (1987) introduced a specification of dynamic discrete choice model that directly extends (1) so that u j 's are the deterministic components of the alternative specific value functions. Hotz and Miller (1993) proposed a computationally attractive estimation procedure for this specification, which together with its extensions (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007b) , Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) , and Bajari et al. (2007) ) is widely applied, especially in empirical industrial organization. Hotz and Miller (1993) showed in their Proposition 1 that if G has a positive continuous density on R J+1 then φ is differentiable and has an inverse, φ −1 , defined on its image, φ(R J ) (they did not show that the image, φ(R J ), covers the interior of the simplex, see line 7 in their proof of Proposition 1 for a precise statement of their result). Based on this result, Hotz and Miller (1993) proposed a two stage estimator. In the first stage of the procedure, the choice probabilities are estimated non-parametrically as functions of covariates (observed state variables). Let us denote this estimator byp. In the second stage, φ is inverted to obtainû = φ −1 (p), which is then used to estimate structural parameters without ever solving the structural dynamic optimization model (solution of the optimization problem is very computationally intensive). Hotz and Miller (1993) 's procedure is usually used with the assumption that j 's are extreme value i.i.d. In this case φ and φ −1 have known analytical expressions (multinomial logit, see Domencich and McFadden (1975) for derivations) and φ is clearly surjective (its image is equal to the interior of ∆ J ). Suppose an econometrician is not willing to use an extreme value distribution for G and uses another distribution instead, for example, a normal distribution. If the implied φ were not surjective then it could have happened that φ −1 were not defined atp and Hotz and Miller (1993) 's procedure would be problematic. Theorem 1 shows that this does not happen under Hotz and Miller (1993) 's assumptions.
Next, let us consider implications of the theorem for identification of multinomial choice models. Sufficient conditions for semi-and non-parametric identification of u and G can be found in Matzkin (1991) and Matzkin (1993) . Theorem 1 shows that without additional restrictions on u as functions of covariates the knowledge of p (p can be estimated from data on individual choices) does not imply any restrictions on G at least in the class of distributions satisfying Assumption 1. Thus, even partial (or set) identification of G is not possible without additional restrictions on u.
Finally, let us consider implications of Theorem 1 for models based on covariate dependent mixture models. Covariate dependent mixtures, also known as mixtures of experts in statis- 
where f is a density and (π 0 (x), . . . , π J (x)) are mixing probabilities. Norets (2010) (2010) gives a rigorous proof of an approximation result for (2) used with a multinomial logit model for (π 0 (x), . . . , π J (x)). Theorem 1 implies that the result holds for any G satisfying assumptions of Hotz and Miller (1993) .
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, let us redefine the mapping from utilities to choice probabilities so that it has the domain equal to a J-dimensional simplex. This is achieved by using log(x j ) instead of u j inside the mapping from utilities to choice probabilities. Since u j 's can have a location example,
is continuous, has degree zero, and satisfies h 0 (y) = h 0 (−y) for any y ∈ S J−1 .
Define a homotopy H :
Note that H is well-defined and continuous since h 0 (y) = h 0 (−y). We have h 0 = H(·, 0). Since
for all x ∈ S J−1 , it follows from the Borsuk-Ulam theorem that h 1 has an odd degree. This contradicts that h 0 and h 1 are homotopic.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Mapping φ was originally defined on R J under the location normalization for utilities. We
To prove the claim of the corollary it suffices to show that u j − u 0 = u j − u 0 for any j.
Let J * = argmax j=0,...,J [u j − u j ]. If J * = {0, 1, . . . , J} then u j − u 0 = u j − u 0 for any j and the corollary is proved. In order to obtain a contradiction we assume {0, . . . , J} \ J * = ∅. . For any ∈ O, any j ∈ J * , any k / ∈ J * , u j + j > u k + k and if we change by a sufficiently small amount the resulting optimal choice(s) conditional on
